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INTRODUCTION 
I t  i s  widely  recognized t h a t  l i n k a g e s  between congress-  
men and t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  t end  t o  be  r a t h e r  more complex 
phenomena than  t h e  conceptua l  maps of behav io ra l  r e s e a r c h  
sugges t .  This  paper i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  r e s e a r c h  grounded i n  an  
i n t e r e s t  group theo ry  of p o l i t i c s  and concerned wi th  t h e  
form and c o n t e n t  of such l i n k a g e s ,  p a v t l c u l a r l y  t h o s e  between 
members of t h e  House of Represen ta t ives  and t h e  mass p u b l i c s  
compris ing t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  W e  s h a l l  n o t  be  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  l i n k a g e s  t o  more s p e c i a l i z e d  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  such a s  organ- 
i z e d  p r e s s u r e  groups,  l o c a l  p a r t y  i n f l u e n t i a l s ,  weal thy 
p a t r o n s ,  e t c . ,  even though a  concern wi th  t h e s e  l i n k a g e s  i s  
e a s i l y  subsumed by t h e  more g e n e r a l  i n t e r e s t  group p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
By a  mass p u b l i c  we r e f e r  t o  t h e  t o t a l  c o n s t i t u e n c y  a s  a  
c o l l e c t i v i t y  o r  t o  any s u b - c o l l e c t i v i t y  w l t h i n  i t  which forms 
a  community of i n t e r e s t  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  d e c i s i o n s  taken  i n  
Congress. Two k inds  of r e s e a r c h  touch upon t h i s  f ami ly  o f  
l i n k a g e s :  f i r s t ,  t h a t  done on l i n k a g e s  t o  o p i n i o n s  and a t t i -  
t udes  i n  mass p u b l i c s ;  and, second,  t h a t  done on l i n k a g e s  t o  
p u b l i c s  which s h a r e  a  reward p o s i t i o n  i n  v i r t u e  of  involvement 
i n  s i m i l a r  a c t i v i t i e s  o r  similar l i f e  s i t u a t i o n s  (which w e  
a r e  c a l l i n g  "communities of i n t e r e s t " ) .  
Recognizing t h e  decep t ive  s i m p l i c i t y  of  t h e  b a s i c  pos tu-  
l a t e  of t h e  i n t e r e s t  group perspect ive--s imply p u t ,  t h a t  
l i n k a g e s  should f u n c t i o n  a s  channe ls  through which c o n s t r a i n t s  
on congres s iona l  behavior a r e  communicated--the t h r u s t  of  
b e h a v i o r a l  r e s e a r c h  i n  t h i s  a r e a  has  been i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of 
s o  m i r r o r i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a s  t o  d e s c r i b e  i t  
i n  more r e a l i s t i c a l l y  complex models,  Thus, some e f f o r t s  have 
sought t o  demons t ra te  t h a t  c o n s t r a i n t s  a r i s i n g  from t h e  b e l i e f s  
of c o n s t i t u e n t s  can  be seen i n  l i n k a g e s  between dimensions i n  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e i r  e l e c t o r a l  a t t i t u d e s  and dimensions 
of c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n - - s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  dimensions i n  t h e  organ- 
i z a t i o n  of t h e i r  e l e c t o r a l  a t t i t u d e s  t h a t  r e f l e c t  t h e  i s s u e  
a r e a s  e x p l i c i t  i n  congres s iona l  d e c i s i o n  making. A congress-  
man's  v o t e ,  i n  t h i s  view, i s  some f u n c t i o n  of wh3t h i s  con- 
s t i t u e n t s  b e l i e v e ,  h i s  pe rcep t ion  of  t h e s e  b e l i e f s ,  and t h e  
congruence between h i s  b e l i e f s  and t h e l r  b e l l e f s  ( M i l l e r  and 
S tokes ,  1964) .  This  i s  a  concep tua l ly  s a t i s f y i n g  model, one 
t h a t  maps a  complex communication i n  a  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p l a u s i b l e  
des ign .  B u i l t  i n t o  it, however, a r e  questions of f u r t h e r  
i n t e r e s t ,  and it i s  t o  t h e s e  t h a t  ou r  remarks a r e  addressed .  
There  a r e  two assumptions i n  t h i s  k ind  of r e s e a r c h ,  The 
f i r s t  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  c o n t e n t  of l i n k a g e s ,  t h e  second w i t h  t h e  
model by which he d e s c r i b e s  them, The rest of  t h i s  paper  i s  
organized  i n t o  two main s e c t i o n s ,  each d e a l l n g  w i t h  one of 
t h e s e  i s s u e s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n ,  w e  s h a l l  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  
assumption t h a t  l i n k a g e s  g i v e  r ise  t o  c o n s t r a i n t s  on congres-  
s i o n a l  behavior  on ly  when they r e f l e c t  dimensions i n  c o n s t i t u -  
e n t s  e l e c t o r a l  b e l i e f s  which m i r r o r  g e n e r a l  I s s u e  a r e a s  of 
congres s iona l  a c t l o n .  Reanalysis  of d a t a  on a t t i < u d e  organi -  
z a t i o n  i n  mass p u b l i c s  sugges t s  a  s i n g l e  i s s u e - f r e e  dimension 
of o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  government a c t i v i t y  t h a t  y i e l d s  c o n s t r a i n t s  
on r o l l  c a l l  behavior ,  r a t h e r  t han  m u l t i p l e  dimensions re- 
f l e c t i n g  s e v e r a l  g e n e r a l  i s s u e  a r e a s .  I n  t h e  second p a r t  of 
t h e  paper ,  we cons ide r  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of vary ing  r a t e s  of  
r e spons iveness  on t h e  p a r t s  of l e g i s l a t o r s  t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
a r i s i n g  from t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  b e l i e f s  and i n t e r e s t s .  I n  s o  
do ing ,  w e  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  assumption of t h e  l i n e a r i t y  of l i n k -  
ages  between c o n s t i t u e n c y  and congres s ,  Following B e n t l e y ' s  
t heo ry  of t h e  i n t e r e s t  group b a s i s  o f  p o l i t i c s  (Bent ley ,  
1 9 4 9 ) ,  w e  p r e s e n t  a  f l e x i b l e  f o r m a l i z a t i o n  of a l t e r n a t i v e  
non- l inear  l i n k a g e  models, i l l u s t r a t i n g  t h e i r  u t i l i t y  wi th  
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s ' o f  agg rega t e  p a t t e r n s  i n  r o l l  c a l l  vo t ing  
ove r  s e v e r a l  i s s u e - a r e a s ,  
THE ORGANIZATION OF ELECTORAL ATTITUDES 
The development of  an unders tanding  of t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of 
l e g i s l a t i v e  bod ie s  i s  perhaps  t h e  major a r e a  i n  which behav- 
i o r a l  r e s e a r c h  has  l e d  t o  a  deeper  understanding of t h e  func- 
t i o n i n g  o f  a  major p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  ( f o r  an  overvlew of 
t h i s  f i e l d ,  s e e  MacRae, 1968) .  However, t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between theory  r ega rd ing  t h e  r a t h e r  p r e c i s e  
l i n k a g e s  t h a t  a r e  presumed t o  e x i s t  between cons t i t uency  
a t t i t u d e s  and congres s iona l  behavior ,  on t h e  one hand, and 
r e s e a r c h  on a t t i t u d e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  among t h e  mass e l e c t o r a t e  
on t h e  o t h e r .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  popular  
p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  a r e  n o t  h i g h l y  enough s t r u c t u r e d  t o  p l a c e  
t h e  k i n d s  of  c o n s t r a i n t s  on l e g i s l a t i v e  behavior  t h a t  a r e  
p o s t u l a t e d  t o  e x i s t ,  
I n  t h e i r  a n a l y s i s  of  American p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  Camp- 
b e l l  and h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  (1960) r e p o r t  t h a t  1956 d a t a  on  i s s u e s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  domest ic  w e l f a r e  s c a l e  accord ing  t o  Guttman's  
, c r i t e r i a  (See Guttman, 1950) ,  a s  do  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s s u e s ,  
w i t h  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  between scales. Axelrod,  however, 
r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  Survey Research C e n t e r ' s  1956 e l e c t i o n  s t u d y ,  
and ' s u b s t i t u t i n g  c l u s t e r  a n a l y s i s  (Bonner , 1964) .  f o r  more 
conven t iona l  s c a l i n g  t echn iques ,  found no s t r o n g  s t r u c t u r i n g  
of  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  (Axelrod, 1967) .  Indeed,  t h e  domest ic  
w e l f a r e  i s s u e s  could  on ly  be regarded  a s  s c a l a b l e  i f  a  c r i -  
t e r i o n  v a l u e  of $/@ max of  . 1 4  were a c c e p t a b l e .  $/@ max t e n d s  
t o  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  a  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  same d a t a ,  
and a  v a l u e  of .75 is  g e n e r a l l y  regarded  a s  neces sa ry  f o r  
Guttman s c a l i n g  (See Cureton,  1959) .- Axe l rod ' s  a n a l y s i s  d i d  
produce a  c l u s t e r  of i t e m s  i n c l u d i n g  domest ic  w e l f a r e  and non- 
w e l f a r e  i s s u e s ,  and f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s s u e s ,  t h a t  were more 
h i g h l y  i n t e r r e l a t e d  than  t h e  i t e m s  i n  Campbell 's  s c a l e s .  H e  
d e f i n e d  t h i s  c l u s t e r  a s  "populism." 
Converse ' s  (1964) a n a l y s i s  of t h e  Survey Research C e n t e r .  
d a t a  s i m i l a r l y  f a i l e d  t o  d i s c o v e r  t h e  deg ree  of mutual  con- 
s t r a i n t  among p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  t h a t  would be expec ted  t o  
appear  i n  a  unidimensional  space.  While h i s  r e p o r t  on d a t a  
c o l l e c t e d  i n  a s tudy  of t h e  1958 congres s iona l  e l e c t i o n  show 
t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between a t t i t u d e s  w i t h i n  domes t ic  o r  
f o r e i g n  a r e n a s  w e r e  s t r o n g e r  t han  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between 
a t t i t u d e s  c r o s s - c u t t i n g  domestic and f o r e i g n  i s s u e s ,  even t h e  
former a s s o c i a t i o n s  w e r e  weak. (Cf McPhee, e t  a l . ,  1962.)  
The mean tau-gamma c o e f f i c i e n t  (see Goodman and Kruskal ,  1954) 
among a t t i t u d e s ,  w i t h i n  both  domestic and f o r e i g n  rea lms ,  was 
.23. Moreover, McClosky, e t  a l .  (1960) h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  demon- 
s t r a t e d  t h a t  among members of t h e  mass p u b l i c ,  even such  a  
man i f e s t  p o l i t i c a l  cue  as p a r t y  cho ice  i s  n o t  an  impor t an t  con- 
s t r a i n t  on i s s u e  p o s i t i o n .  , 
Lut tbe rg  (1968) t a k e s  i s s u e  wi th  Conve r se ' s  f i n d i n g s ,  I n  
a  f a c t o r  a n a l y t i c  s tudy  of  survey d a t a  c o l l e c t e d  i n  2 Oregon 
communities, he f i n d s  no d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  mutual  c o n s t r a i n t  of  
a t t i t u d e s  between l e a d e r s  and fo l lower s .  The i t ems  h e  used,  
however, r e f e r  t o  l o c a l  r a t h e r  t han  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s ,  
and hence pose no problems f o r  u s .  The n o t i o n  t h a t  people  have 
more s t r u c t u r e d  b e l i e f s  on l o c a l  t han  on n a t i o n a l  i s s u e s  i s  n o t  
incompat ib le  w i th  ou r  fo rmula t ion ,  
ISSUE LINKAGES BETWEEN LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUENCY 
Th i s  appa ren t  weakness of a t t i t u d e  s t r u c t u r e  n o t  wi th-  
s t a n d i n g ,  M i l l e r  and Stokes  (1966: 3 5 7 ) ,  ana lyz ing  t h e  same 
d a t a  t h a t  Converse (1964) used,  r e p o r t  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  
t h r e e  s c a l e s ,  u s ing  techniques  developed by Guttman and 
o t h e r s ,  cover ing  t h r e e  i s s u e  domains: s o c i a l  w e l f a r e ,  American 
involvement i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  and c i v i l  r i g h t s .  
E igh t  a t t i t u d e  i t e m s  had been inc luded  i n  t h e  1958 survey.  
Each of them appeared i n  one of t h e  scales. The t h r e e  s c a l e s  
de f ined  by M i l l e r  and S tokes '  a n a l y s i s  w e r e :  
A .  S o c i a l  Welfare Sca le .  
1. The government should l e a v e  t h i n g s  l i k e  e l e c t r i c  
power and housing f o r  p r i v a t e  businessmen t o  handle .  
2 .  The government i n  Washington ought  t o  see t o  it t h a t  
everybody who wants t o  work can  f i n d  a  job,  
3 .  I f  c i t i e s  and towns around t h e . c o u n t r y  need h e l p  t o  
b u i l d  more schoo l s ,  t h e  government i n  Washington 
ought  t o  g i v e  them t h e  money they  need.  
B. I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  Sca le .  
1. This  coun t ry  would be b e t t e r  o f f  i f  w e  j u s t  s t ayed  
home and d i d  n o t  concern o u r s e l v e s  w i t h  problems i n  
o t h e r  p a r t s  of t h e  world. 
2 .  The United S t a t e s  should g i v e  economic h e l p  t o  t h e  
- poorer  c o u n t r i e s  of the-  wor ld  even i f  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  
c a n ' t  pay f o r  it. 
3 .  The United S t a t e s  should keep s o l d i e r s  ove r seas  where 
they  can  h e l p  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  a g a i n s t  communism. 
C .  C i v i l  Righ ts -  Sca l e .  
1. I f  Negroes a r e -  n o t  g e t t i n g  f a i r  t r e a t m e n t  i n  jobs  and 
housing,  t h e  government should see t o  it t h a t  t hey  do. 
2 .  The government in-Washington shou ld  s t a y  o u t  of t h e  
q u e s t i o n  of whether whi te  and co lo red  c h i l d r e n  go t o  
t h e  same school .  1 
For t h e  116 congres s iona l  d i s t r i c t s  i n  which i n t e r v i e w s  
w e r e  conducted i n  1958, mean c o n s t i t u e n c y  s c o r e s  were com- 
pu ted ,  and c o r r e l a t e d  wi th  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  and r o l l - c a l l  behavior  
of  congressmen, wi th  weights  being a s s i g n e d  t o  each d i s t r i c t  
approximate ly  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  number of i n t e r v i e w s  t aken .  
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o n s t i t u e n c y  o p i n i o n  and r o l l - c a l l  
v o t e s  i n  t h e  a r e a  of  c i v i l  r i g h t s  was abou t  .65, t h e  h i g h e s t  
c o r r e l a t i o n  a t t a i n e d .  The agreement between congressmen and 
t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  on economic w e l f a r e  w a s  approximately  . 4 ,  
and on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of f o r e i g n  involvement ,  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
was less than  . 2 .  
RESCALING THE 1958 DATA 
The seeming c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between t h e  absence of h igh ly  
s t r u c t u r e d  cons t i t uency  a t t i t u d e s ,  on t h e  one hand, and t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  seem t o  be  p laced  on c o n g r e s s i o n a l  behavior  
by c o n s t i t u e n c y  op in ion ,  on t h e  o t h e r ,  has  l e d  u s  t o  f u r t h e r  
e x p l o r e  t h e  d a t a  u t i l i z e d  by M i l l e r  and S tokes .  An a t t e m p t  was 
made t o  r e p l i c a t e  t h e i r  t h r e e  s c a l e s ,  u s i n g  t h e  m u l t i - s c a l i n g  
program developed by t h e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S o c i a l  Research f o r  u s e  
on t h e  IBM 7090  computer a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  of Michigan. The 8  
a t t i t u d e  items, which had 5 p o i n t  L i k e r t  response  s c a l e s ,  were 
dichotomized by c o l l a p s i n g  t h e  s t r o n g l y  a g r e e  and a g r e e  c a t e -  
g o r i e s ,  and t h e  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  and d i s a g r e e  c a t e g o r i e s .  
Undecided responses  were t r e a t e d  as mis s ing  d a t a .  Th i s  i s  con- 
s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  l o g i c  of  Guttman s c a l i n g ,  which s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of a  c u t t i n g  p o i n t  w i l l  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  s c a l a b i l i t y  
o f  an  i t e m ,  a l though  it may a f f e c t  t h a t  i t e m ' s  p o s i t i o n  on t h e  
s c a l e .  The 8 items were submi t ted  a s  a s i n g l e  d a t a  s e t ,  w i t h  
no a  p r i o r i  assumption of u n i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y .  The minimum 
c o e f f i c i e n t  of r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y  a c c e p t a b l e  was se t  a t  .85,  and 
a d j a c e n t  i t e m s  w e r e  t e s t e d  f o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  independence us ing  
t h e  ch i - square  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s  a c r i t e r i o n .  Adjacent  items 
n o t  r e l a t e d  t o  each  o t h e r  a t  t h e  . O 1  l e v e l  o r  b e t t e r  w e r e  
d i s c a r d e d .  
Given t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  a  s i n g l e  3 i t e m  index ,  con ta in -  
i n g  one i t e m  from each of  t h e  3 s c a l e s  d e r i v e d  by Miller and 
S tokes ,  was genera ted .  The i t e m s  i nc luded  w e r e :  2 
1. I f  Negroes a r e -  n o t  g e t t i n g  f a i r  t r e a t m e n t  i n  jobs  
and--housing, t h e  government should see t o  it t h a t  t hey  do. 
2 .  I f  c i t i e s  and towns around t h e  coun t ry  need h e l p  
t o  b u i l d  more s c h o o l s ,  t h e  government i n  Washington ought  t o  
g i v e  them t h e  money they  need. 
3 .  The United S t a t e s  should g i v e  economic h e l p  t o  t h e  
poorer  c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  world even i f  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  c a n ' t  
pay f o r  it. 
These items s c a l e d  w i t h  a c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y  
of  .979. While w e  do n o t  sugges t  t h a t  t hey  measure a un i -  
d imensional  a t t i t u d e  space ,  t hey  do s e e m  t o  s h a r e  a s  a common 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o r i e n t a t i o n s  toward f e d e r a l  governmental  
a c t i v i t y ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of  a r ena .  
I n s o f a r  a s  2 of t h e s e  i t e m s  concern government expendi-  
t u r e s ,  one might choose t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  index a s  measuring 
economic l i b e r a l i s m .  L i p s e t  (1968) has  argued t h a t  t h e  
l i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e  dimension must be  d i v i d e d  i n t o  economic 
and non-economic a r e n a s ,  and a l though  t h e  f i r s t  i t e m  i n  o u r  
index does  n o t  d i r e c t l y  c o n f r o n t  t h e  i s s u e  of government 
expenditures in the realm of civil rights, this is one plausi- 
ble interpretation of the index. 
CONSTITUENCY LIBERALISM AND ECONOMIC ROLL-CALLS 
To test this interpretation of our index, we studied the 
relationship between constituency attitudes and congressional 
votes on federal expenditures. Like Mlller and Stokes, we 
computed mean index scores for constituencies. However, rather 
than weighting the 116 congressional districts in the total 
sample, we included in our analysis only data from the 36 dis- 
tricts in which 20 or more interviews were taken. Research by 
Segal and Wildstrom (1968) has shown that a cluster of 20 
interviews produces a close estimate of population parameters. 
Note that this is not a major discrepancy between our proce- 
dures and those of Miller and Stokes. Their constituency 
weights were roughly proportional to the number of interviews 
taken; so the districts we studied were those that played the 
greatest part in their analysis, while those in which only 1 
or 2 respondents were interviewed, which we omitted, pre- 
sumably contributed little explanation or error variance to 
their study. 
Our mean index scores were correlated with the percentage 
of 21 roll calls in which each constituency's representative 
voted "yea" or "nayn.in opposition to moves to limit federal 
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spending in 1958. Over the set of districts studied, the 
zero-order correlation between mean constituency opinion and 
congressional roll-call behavior was slightly greater than .18; 
roughly the same magnitude that Miller and Stokes found with 
regard to constituency-legislator agreement.on foreign in- 
volvement. 
Miller and Stokes suggest that constituency influence on 
legislators is based upon agreement between a legislator's 
votes and "his. own policy views or his perceptions.of the 
district views,'! and a correspondence between the "attitudes 
or perceptions governing the Representative's acts," and the 
actual opinion of his constituency, 
A corollary to this formulation of legislators represent- 
ing the interests of their-constituents.is that if there is no 
correspondence between,the legislator's acts and the opinions 
,of his. constitutents, there will be dissatisfaction and the 
legislator will not be re-elected. To test this proposition, 
we computed the relationship between constituency attitudes 
and -congressional roll-calls for those 6 districts in our set 
of 36 that elected someone other than the incumbent to Congress 
in 1958. The correlation for these 6 districts was -.63, a 
statistic the magnitude of which must be interpreted in the 
light of the low case base. More importantly, with these 
cases accounted for, the relationship between constituency 
attitude and roll-call behavior for the remaining 30 districts 
was . 4 3 .  This.,is lower than the direct linkage found to 
exist between constituency attitudes and representatives' 
roll-call behavior in the area of civil rights by Miller and 
Stokes. It is greater than the relationship they found in 
the areas.of domestic welfare and foreign involvement. Thus, 
once w e  t a k e . i n t o  account  l e g i s l a t o r s  who a r e  punished by. 
t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  f o r .  n o t  v o t i n g  i n  accordance w i t h  popula r  
opinion;our e s s e n t i a l l y  i s s u e - f r e e  index  of  popula r  s u p p o r t  
f o r  f e d e r a l  expend i tu re s  becomes a  b e t t e r  p r e d i c t i o n  of  l e g i s -  
l a t i v e  r o l l - c a l l . b e h a v i o r  than  a r e  2 o f  t h e  3 i s s u e - r e l a t e d  
s c a l e s  used by M i l l e r  and Stokes .  
Our r e s u l t s  t o  t h i s  p o i n t . d o  n o t  l e a d  u s  t o  r e f u t e  an  
i n t e r e s t  group theo ry  of p o l i t i c s ,  b u t - t h e y  do sugges t  t h a t  
t h e r e . a r e  a l t e r n a t i v e  means of d e f i n i n g  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h o s e -  
found i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e - .  More impor t an t ly ,  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  
var - iance  c o n t r i b u t e d  by- non-responsive l e g i s l a t o r s  a s  an  exam- 
p l e ,  we a rgue  t h a t  one . canno t . a s sume  t h e  l i n e a r i t y  of l i n k a g e s  
between cons t i t uency  and Congress, and hypothes ize  t h a t  t h e  
shape of t h e  " i n f l u e n c e  curve"  may w e l l  be  a  Zunction of  t h e  
i s s u e s  a t  ques t ion .  It i s  t o  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n -  t h a t -  w e  now 
t u r n  ou r  a t t e n t i o n .  
THE INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF POLITICS 
Both ou r  own r e s e a r c h  and t h a t  of M i l l e r  and S tokes  i s  
based upon an " i n t e r e s t  group" theo ry  of  p o l i t i c s ,  such a s  
t h a t  suggested by Bent ley (1949) ,  which a s s e r t s  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between t h e  decision-making of e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and 
t h e  p r e s s u r e s  brought  t o  bear  on them by communities of  
i n t e r e s t  w i t h i n  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  I t  w a s  B e n t l e y ' s  view 
t h a t  a c t i v i t i e s  gave r ise t o  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h a t  i n t e r e s t s  
coa l e sced  t o  produce p r e s s u r e s ,  and t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  could  be 
analyzed i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  ma t r ix  of  such p r e s s u r e s ,  
convergent and nonconvergent, placed on representatives. 
Under the assumption that elected representatives will act 
rational1y.to maximize their election chances by catering to 
such interests;and assuming that there.is.ful1 communication 
in the political system to make interests visible; this theory 
can be formalized to produce statements about the process of 
government that are not obvious. In what follows, we shall 
present a limited formalization of certain implications of 
Bentley's model and treat these.implications in conjunction 
with data on Congressional roll-call votingo It will be argued 
that judgements about the nature of the political process can 
be deduced from departures of observed voting patterns from 
those predicted under the Bentley model, A limited number of 
such-patterns will be considered, as will a convenient method 
I 
of operationalizing the concepts in Bentleyk theory, 
SYSTEM-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES OF BENTLEY'S THEORY 
1. It can be argued that Bentley's model of decision- 
making presumes a tendency for representatives to act in their 
self-interests. The rational action principle may be inter- 
preted as a disposition to maximize the political returns on 
each accountable decision. We may infer that the principal 
criterion of such returns is assessed as the effect of the 
given decision upon the probability of re-election. Therefore, 
the evaluation of self-interest translates, in political 
terms, into an evaluation of the interests of those upon whom 
the political fate of the representative depends: In maximizing 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i n  g iven  d e c i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
t a k e s  cues  from c o n s t i t u e n t s  who- a r e  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  a f f e c t  
h i s  p o l i t i c a l  f a t e .  
This  i s  n o t ,  of  cou r se ,  an  unambiguous dependency. I n  
f a c t ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  i s s u e s  on which v o t e s  a r e  t aken  a r e  of 
no ( o r  l i t t l e )  consequence t o  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  
This  does,  n o t  imply t h a t  h i s  d e c i s i o n s  on v o t e s  on which h i s  
c o n s t i t u e n t s  a r e  i n d i f f e r e n t  have no consequence f o r  h i s  elec- 
t i o n  chances .  I n  such m a t t e r s  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  p o l i t i c a l  v a r i a -  
bles may e n t e r  t h e  c a l c u l u s .  For example, when a  v o t e  i s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  o t h e r s  b u t  n o t  t o  h i m s e l f ,  a  s e q u e n t i a l  exchange 
can  be a r ranged  i n  which he can v o t e  i n  a n o t h e r ' s  i n t e r e s t s  
i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e i r  v o t e s  on f u t u r e  b i l l s  r e l e v a n t  t o  h i s .  
I f  t h e  v o t e  has  p a r t i s a n  ove r tones  and d i s t r i c t  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  
ambiguous, p a r t y  a l l e g i a n c e  can pay o f f  i n  campaign a s s i s t a n c e  
o r  o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  p o l i t i c a l  c a p i t a l .  Gene ra l ly  v o t e s  on 
b i l l s  i n  which t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  r e l e v a n c e  t o  c o n s t i t u -  
e n t s  can be  an  e f f e c t i v e  shor t - te rm inves tmen t  i n  f u t u r e  a c t i o n  
\ s i t u a t i o n s .  
S e l f - i n t e r e s t  i s  c l e a r  when c o n s t i t u e n c y  p r e s s u r e s  a r e  
congruent ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  when they  a r e  i n t e n s e ,  I n t e n s i t y  
of p r e s s u r e  from c o n s t i t u e n t s  g u a r a n t e e s  on ly  t h e  concern of 
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  w i t h  an i s s u e ,  n o t  h i s  v o t e .  When a l l  
sou rces  of p r e s s u r e  a r e  congruent ,  t h e  v o t e  i s  a l s o  determined.  
When t h e r e  are c o n f l i c t i n g  p r e s s u r e ,  p o l i t i c a l  succes s  depends 
upon e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  of t h e  consequences of support -  
i n g  one s i d e  and a l i e n a t i n g  t h e  o t h e r .  I n  such c o n f l i c t e d  
situations, and in cases where the legislation is controver- 
sial but information on constituency interests and opinions 
is ambiguous, it is.likely that efforts will be made to seek 
out clarifying influence and advice or, if cross pressures 
are too intense, to leave the field by not voting. 
Regardless of the action taken, the assumption holds that 
it is the effort to maximize returns (and/or to minimize 
losses) which is the structuring principle, In terms of 
Bentley's model of the creation of pressures upon decision, 
the aggregate or collective decision or outcome in a given 
vote is determined by the simultaneous influence of all such 
pressure from all constituencies upon representatives. But 
the probability that a single representative will vote for a 
given interest is in proportion to the capacity of the interest 
to alter his election chances, The greater such capacity, 
the higher the probability of votes supportive of it. 
2, Putting aside questions of the comparability of dif- 
ferent legislator's evaluations of the same pressures or 
interests, Bentley's general theory suggests an aggregate 
proposition. Over a large number of individuals evaluating 
district interests of different magnitudes, the probability 
of their collective support for the interest increases 
directly with the strength of the interest, 
In terms of Bentley's model, let us consider that the 
capacity of an activity to (generate a community of interest 
I 
which can) effect pressures on representatives to make deci- 
sions favoring it is some increasing function of the proportion 
of  d i s t r i c t  c o n s t i t u e n t s  engaged i n  it. This  hypo thes i s  can 
be r e p r e s e n t e d ,  f o r  example, by t h e  l i n e a r  f u n c t i o n  p l o t t e d  
i n  F igu re  1. 
Per c e n t  p r e s e n t  
v o t i n g  i n  f a v o r  
of i n t e r e s t  " i "  
P r o p o r t i o n  of con- 
s t i t u e n c y  wi th  
i n t e r e s t  " i "  
F igu re  1 
Along t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  i s  p l o t t e d  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  
t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  which can b e . s a i d  t o  be i n  f avo r  o f - s o m e  
i n t e r e s t ,  i. The v e r t i c a l  a x i s  p l o t s . t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
d e c i s i o n s .  f avo r ing  i n t e r e s t  i made by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  Thus, 
t h e  p o i n t  P( ,  i n  F igu re  1 would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  p e r  c e n t  
- - 1 ~ )  
of t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from d i s t r i c t s  w i th  - x p e r  c e n t  con- 
s t i t u e n t s  suppor t ing  i n t e r e s t  - i v o t e  i n  f a v o r  of it. 
F O ~  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of i n t e r e s t  and d i f f e r e n t  i s s u e  a r e a s ,  
one would expec t  d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n s  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  r a t e  a t  
which p r e s s u r e s  a r e  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  f a v o r a b l e  d e c i s i o n s .  The 
t h e o r y  s p e c i f i e s  o n l y  t h a t  t h e  f ami ly  of  f u n c t i o n s  correspond-  
i n g  t o  i t s  unders tanding  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces s  should be 
monotonic and i n c r e a s i n g .  Dev ia t ions  from t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  
i n d i c a t e  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  
A l i m i t e d  number of p l a u s i b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  how t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  system i s  f u n c t i o n i n g  may be i n f e r r e d  from observ-  
i n g  f u n c t i o n s  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  B e n t l e y ' s  t heo ry .  
A s e t  of h y p o t h e t i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  i s  p l o t t e d  i n  F i g u r e s  2A-E; 
supplemented by a l l  conce ivab le  lineax f u n c t i o n s  of p o s i t i v e  
s l o p e ,  they r e p r e s e n t  p o s s i b l e  v o t i n g  p a t t e r n s  which a r e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l l y  i n t e r p r e t a b l e .  The 45' l i n e  i n  each  graph ,  of  
cou r se ,  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  l o c u s  of p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of suppor t ing  
an  i n t e r e s t  i f  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n f l u e n c i n g  r ep re sen -  
t a t i v e s '  v o t e s  were d i r e c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  presence  of  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  
F igu re  2 
A s  d e p i c t e d , . i t  a l s o  seems p l a u s i b l e  t o  r e p r e s e n t  d e p a r t -  
u r e s  from t h i s  s imple  l i n e a r  p l o t  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of some p o i n t  
a long  t h e  X-scale a t  which an i n t e r e s t  beg ins  t o  g e n e r a t e  
e f f e c t i v e  p r e s s u r e s .  Such a  f l e x  p o i n t  must n a t u r a l l y  be  
d i f f e r e n t  from i n t e r e s t  t o  i n t e r e s t ,  depending upon t h e  a c t u a l  
or imagined p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  c o r r e l a t e s  of t h e  g iven  
interest. For example, it may take only a relatively small 
proportion of a district's economic base in some area to 
generate effective pressure because- of the organized political 
lobbying and campaign financing which might be associated with 
it. On the other hand, for some less manifestly political or 
organized segment of the constituency, say consumers, a con- 
siderably, larger proportion of the constituency might be neces- 
sary- to capture the representative's attention. Under this 
assumption, Figure 1 might be embellished with hypothetical 
lines of force which, to the left of the flex point, would 
resolve into a vector depressing the probability of favoring 
the interest, and, to the right, resolve into a vector inflat- 
ing the probability. 
Such processes might be.represented by the.-resulting 
function plotted in Figure 2A. 
This function suggests that an interest is at issue in which 
the implications of support or opposition are clear and fully 
communicated; the observed distribution fairly well polarizes 
representatives into two groups, separated clearly at some 
point along the x-axis at which the benefits from favoring the 
interest start to exceed the losses from ignoring or opposing 
it. Calculations of benefits vs. losses which are so 
unambiguously p o s s i b l e  a s  t o  produce such a  p o l a r i z a t i o n ,  
fu r the rmore ,  sugges t  t h e  e x p l l c i t  o p e r a t i o n  of opposing p re s -  
s u r e s .  I t  may be hypothesized,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  such a  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  i s  a  l i k e l y  consequence of  t h e  c a s e  of competing 
i n t e r e s t s  ( t h e  f l e x  p o l n t  moving more o r  l e s s  w i t h  t h e  r e l a -  
t i v e  e f f i c a c y  of t h e  i n t e r e s t  f a v o r i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  
q u e s t i o n . )  
The f u n c t i o n s  In Figures  2B-C, by c o n t r a s t ,  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e s  I n  whlch uniform p r e s s u r e s  e i t h e r  dep re s s  
o r  i n f l a t e  t h e  e f f i c a c y  of p r e s s u r e s  from an  i n t e r e s t .  I t  
may be  i n f e r r e d  t h a t  such d i s t r i b u t i o n s  r e f l e c t  a  consensus 
of  o p i n i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  i s s u e s ,  making t h e  proba- 
b i l i t y  of suppor t  o r  opposition t o  some e x t e n t  independent  
of  whatever s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  it, (By 
c o n t r a s t ,  F i g u r e  2A r e f l e c t s  an i s s u e  independent  of  such 
v a l u e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , . f o r  example, most " p o l i t i c a l "  i s s u e s  
which a r e  amenable t o  compromise, Some " i d e o l o g i c a l "  i s s u e s  
are a l s o  l i k e l y  t o  p o l a r i z e  v o t i n g .  I t  r e q u i r e s  a  more 
e l a b o r a t e  concep tua l  system, however, t o  i n t e r p r e t  i d e o l o g i c a l  
i s s u e s  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  c o n s t ~ t u e n c i e s . )  
F i g u r e s  2A-C, however, a l l  i n c l u d e  f u n c t i o n s  compat ib le  w i t h  
t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t ' t h e r e  i s  some p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
t h e  magnitude of d i s t r i c t  i n t e r e s t s  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  The i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  d e s c r i b e  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s  
of t r ans fo rma t ion  of i n t e r e s t s  i n t o  p r e s s u r e s  (F igu res  2B-C) 
and/or d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t a n t s  of competing p r e s s u r e s  (F igu re  
Figure 2D departs from the expectations of the theory; 
in this case, there is no positive .transformation of interests 
into pressures and pressures into representation, If such a 
distribution were observed, the theory would lead us to infer 
that there was some disruption (breech, circumvention, etc.) 
of the political process: namely, a situation in which the 
disadvantage to people in power of responding to pressures 
from certain interests out of power increases with the propor- 
tion of the population const.ituted by the interest, 
It is highly probable that all of these functions repre- 
sent special cases in the legislative process. Most voting 
outcomes are in reality the result of many of these factors 
operating among subsets of representatives to produce observed 
functions compounded of several effects. In addition, the 
theory does not explicitly take account of the influence of 
partisan considerations and other ex.tra-constituency influ- 
ences. This does not imply, however, that the theory-can play 
no part in their assessment. It is an interesting empirical 
problem, for example, to assess the conditions (or issue- 
areas) in which a factor such as region or party allegiance 
blots out constituency pressures, Under the hypothesis that 
representatives are normatively expected to represent district 
interests, the theory at least provides us with a framework 
for assessing the departures from this expectation. 
Consider the departures represented by the function in 
Figure 2E. The following things are notable: (1) the effect 
of pressures in the lower portion of the curve is inflated; 
( 2 )  t h e  middle  of t h e  curve  i s  r a t h e r  f l a t ,  i n d i c a t i n g  e i t h e r  
equa l  c r o s s  p r e s s u r e s  o r  nega t lng  e x t e r n a l  i n f l u e n c e s ;  and 
( 3 )  t h e  e f f e c t  of p r e s s u r e s  i n  t h e  upper p a r t  i s  d e f l a t e d .  
This  kind of  response  f u n c t i o n  i s  c l e a r l y  compounded of s e v e r a l  
e f f e c t s .  What combination might be  expec ted  t o  produce i t ?  
Observing t h e  p a t t e r n  sugges t s  s e v e r a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s - - f o r  , 
example, a  combination of 2B and 2C and 2D, o r  2A and 2E-- 
which, w i t h  a p p r o p r i a t e  in format ion ,  cou ld  be  explored  empir i -  
c a l l y .  This  could  be accomplished by decomposing t h e  aggre- 
g a t e  f u n c t i o n  i n t o  s epaxa te  f u n c t i o n s  for  each  s u b s e t  o f  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  who might be expected, on o t h e r  grounds,  t o  
be d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  r e spons ive  t o  t h e  same i n t e r e s t .  Once a  
decomposit ion i s  e f f e c t e d  i n t o  some l i m i t e d  number of  t h e o r e t i -  
c a l l y  i n t e r p r e t a b l e  p a r t i a l  f u n c t i o n s  (which can be ' r eaggrega t ed  
t o  produce t h e  observed d i s t r i b u t i o n ) ,  one has  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  
i 
bases  i n  t e r m s  of which r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  g iven  i s s u e  a r e a s  
might be  p r e d i c t e d ,  (Such a  p rocedura l  r a t i o n a l  resembi-7 
o t h e r  p a r t l a l i n g  o r  factoring logics, excep t  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t s  
of t h e  f a c t o r i n g  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  ahead of t i m e  by t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
of decomposing t h e  aggrega te  relationship i n t o  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
i d e n t i f i a b l e  p a r t i a l  f u n c t i o n s ,  e . g , ,  p o l a r i z e d  d i s t r i c t s ,  
p o s i t i v e l y  o r  n e g a t i v e l y  c o n s e n s u a l ~ z e d  d i s t r i c t s ,  d i s t r i c t s  
i n  which t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of i n t e r e s t s  i n t o  e f f e c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
i n f l u e n c e  i s  d i s r u p t e d , )  
I f  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  do t h i s  on some v o t e s ,  a  c l e a r e r  
p i c t u r e  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  should r e s u l t  and p r e d i c t i o n  
of f u t u r e  e f f e c t s  should be poss ible . .  The b e n e f i t s  of t h i s  
s t r a t e g y  and conceptua i  approach a.re i t s  s l m p l i c l t y  and p a r s i -  
mony. The theo ry  beg ins  w i t h  a p r i n c i p l e  of  a c t i o n  ( u t i l i t y  
maximizat ion)  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  from 
which sys tem- leve l  consequences have been syn thes i zed .  
METHODS AND OBJECTIVES 
The p u b l i c a t i o n  of t h e  Congress iona l  D i s t r i c t  Data Book 
p rov ides  us  w i t h  a supply of d a t a  about  t h e  composi t ion of 
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  of t h e  approach 
o u t l i n e d  above, w e  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  r o l l - c a l l  v o t i n g  i n  t h e  
House of  Represen ta t ives  i n  conjuncr ion  w i  t h  e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  
s i z e  of v a r i o u s  d i s t r l c t  I n t e r e s t s  a b s t r a c t e d  from t h i s  supply 
of  d a t a .  
We s h a l l  have two types  of d a t a :  r o l l - c a l l  v o t e s  and 
measures of t h e  p ropor t ion  of people  ( o r  o t h e r  u n i t s  of 
a n a l y s i s ,  such a s  l a b o r e r s  o r  i n d u s t r i a l  p roduc t ion ,  e t c , )  
i n  a  d i s t r i c t  who may be hypothesized t o  shave an  i n t e r e s t .  
O p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t s - - a c t i v i t i e s ,  
i n t e r e s t s ,  p r e s s u r e s ,  and decisions---IS t h e r e f o r e  imprec i se ,  
We s h a l l  be  equa t ing  decisions wi th  v o t e s ,  and assuming t h a t  
v o t e s  a r e  t h e  produc t  of va r ious  h y p o t h e t i c a l l y  o p e r a t i n g  
p r e s s u r e s ,  W e  t h ink  of p r e s s u r e s  a s  phenomena i n t e r v e n i n g  
between d i s t r i c t  i n t e r e s t s  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s  d e c i s i o n s ,  
I n t e r e s t s  a r e  a l s o  unmeasured b u t  thought  t o  be  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
t o  some measure of a c t i v i t i e s  w.it;hin t h e  cons t i t uency .  Need- 
l e s s  t o  s ay ,  t h e r e  i s  room f o r  a  good d e a l  of unmeasured 
i n f l u e n c e  t o  a f f e c t  assessment of the l e g i s l a t u r e  p roces s  i n  
the terms of the model. This is to be born in mind in the 
subsequent considerations. 
Having determined upon a given issue area, however, one 
may proceed to observe the translation of interests into 
pressures, first, by ranking all constituencies on some 
selected indicator (or set of indicators) of their interest 
composition and, second, computing the proportion of repre- 
sentatives in each rank who vote in support of the interest 
on relevant legislation. The observed proportions can then 
be plotted to produce a function that may be assessed like 
those considered in the last section, 
To illustrate this approach, and to consider some of the 
implications of Bentley's Model, we shall present an analysis 
of roll-call voting on civil rights legislation, And to 
assess the joint effect of interests and partisan allegiances, 
we shall also consider votes on agricultural and labor issues. 
These data are intrinsically interesting because they illus- 
trate how very differently the political system operates in 
different circumstances. 
VOTING ON CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
If the political system were operating in accord with 
Bentley's Model, one would expect to observe that support for 
legislation favoring an expansion of legal guarantees for 
civil rights would be positively related to the proportion 
of non-whites in Congressional districts. Of course this is 
not the case, at least for the House of Representatives 
considered in the aggregate. 
Figure 3.1 presents the curve of support for selected 
civil rights legislative in the 87th Congress (HR-7371 and 
SJ-Res 29) for all Congressional districts ranked in terms 
of non-white population composition. The plot reveals a func- 
tion resembling that in Figure 2E, inflated in the lower values 
of the X-scale and flat toward the middlea From this we may 
deduce the compounding of several effects into the observed 
distribution. Given the nature of the issue-area, one may 
hypothesize that the observed pattern is likely the result of 
compounded regional tendencies. That is, in the South, it is 
likely that as per cent non-white increases, the probability 
of favoring civil rights legislative decreases, while in the 
North, the response to civil rights is more tinged by value 
concerns approaching consensus. 
Decomposing the aggregate distribution into distributions 
for regions and specific bills produces the two clear patterns 
graphed in Figure 3.2. The pattern for the North on both 
bills approximates Figure 2C, where it was hypothesized that 
the effects of,pressures are inflated due to a rather preva- 
sive consensus as to the values inherent in the issues. The 
two Southern response function, conversely, closely resemble 
the cure in Figure 2D, depicting a breech in the political 
process. Taken together, the processes operative in the 
North and South determine the aggregate distribution. 
The civil rights issue-area is an example of the repre- 
sentative process which is the combined result of two 
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r e g i o n a l  t endenc ie s ,  one. t h a t . c o n f o r m s - t o  t h e .  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
of  i n t e r e s t  group theo ry  and t h e - o t h e r  t h a t  d e v i a t e s  from 
t h o s e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  We a r e  l e d  t o  i n £  er.  from t h e  u t i l i t y -  
maximization schema t h a t  t h e  g a i n s  o f  suppor t ing  c i v i l  r i g h t s  
i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  North a r e  e v a l u a t e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  i n  excess  
of  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  of non-whites t o  i n f l u e n c e  e l e c t i o n  
chances .  I n  t h e  South,  where t h e  o p p o s i t e  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  w e  
a r e  l e d  t o  t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces s  circum- 
v e n t s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of non-whites t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  e l e c t o r a l  
i n f l u e n c e s .  
An examinat ion of  a l l  c i v i l  r i g h t s  l e g i s l a t i o n  cons idered  
i n  t h e  87 th  and 88 th  Congress r e v e a l e d  a  c o n s i s t e n t  r e p l i c a -  
t i o n  of t h e s e  r e g i o n a l  t endenc ie s .  
VOTING ON INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION 
Clea r  measures of meaningful  c o n s t i t u e n c y  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  
a l s o  a v a i l a b l e  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s .  L e s s  d e t a i l e d  examinat ions  
of a g r i c u l t u r a l  and produc t ion  workers '  i n t e r e s t  r ep re sen ta -  
t i o n  may be cons idered  h e r e  t o  rev iew t h e  Bent ley theo ry  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  i s sue -a reas .  I n  doing t h i s  we s h a l l  a l s o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  e f f e c t  of  p a r t y  a l l e g i a n c e  on t h e  i n t e r e s t  hypothes i s .  
To observe  t h e  e f f i c a c y  of  p r e s s u r e s  from v a r i o u s  d i s -  
t r i c t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of i n d u s t r i a l  employees, t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of v o t e s  on HR-3935 (87 th  Congress)  has  been determined i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p ropor t ion  of t h e  popu la t ions  of d i s t r i c t s  
composed of i n d u s t r i a l  workers.  The range of such concent ra -  
t i o n s  i s  narrower t han  f o r  non-white (from about  0 .5% t o  about  
-27- 
16.7%), and is here subdivided into four.ranks containing 
approximately-equal numbers.of districts. HR-3935 was an 
amendment to weaken the minimum wage proposal of the presi- 
dent, and was. opposed by- labor interest, We .consequently 
consider a "nay" vote to be favorable to the labor interest 
and to the administration. The distribution of votes favor- 
ing labor is plotted in Figure 4,l. The aggregate plot is 
consistent with the theory, and the shape of the functions 
suggests at.least two lines of interpretation. First, the 
general function resembles Figure 2A, suggesting a decision- 
frame in which there is high communication in the system and 
good vis-ibility of the consequences of voting for or against. 
Therefore, we.wou-ld expect that further decomposition of the 
function would produce partial functions replicating the same 
pattern, i.e., of the same shape with a clear "flex point" 
at which rewards outbalance costs. Secondly, the flex point-- 
falling between I1 and 111--might be interpreted itself, say, 
as a threshold of.industrialization in districts, beyond 
which the impact of industrial organization in districts be- 
gins to ramify beyond its immediate boundaries (perhaps, 
producing aggregation of convergent labor dependent interests). 
(This- implication might be assessed, for example, by summing 
the number of interests correlated with the concentration of 
\ 
industrial employees which also predict to this voting 
function.) 
Decomposing the distribution by party affiliation con- 
firms these.expectationsi (See Figure 4,l) The curves for 
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Democrats and Republicans p a r a l l e l  one a n o t h e r ,  though a t  
d i f f e r e n t  magnitudes.  The e f f e c t  o f  p a r t y  i s  c l e a r  and 
s t r o n g ,  b u t  q u i t e  independent of  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  e x e r t e d  by 
l a b o r  i n t e r e s t s .  
On v o t e s  p e r t i n e n t  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  can 
be  observed.  The concen t r a t i on  of farms i n  d i s t r i c t s  maybe 
s t a n d a r d i z e d  f o r  t h i s . p u r p o s e  by.comput ing a  farm: popula- 
t i o n  r a t e  ( l e e . ,  t h e  number of farms p e r  100 p e o p l e ) .  The 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  on t h i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  from 0,O t o  10 .9 ,  and has  
been broken i n t o  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  c o n t a i n i n g  approximately  
e q u a l  numbers of d i s t r i c t s .  
To observe  t h e  e f f i c a c y  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n t e r e s t s  a s  
indexed by t h i s  farm c o n c e n t r a t i o n  measure,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of v o t e s  on t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Act of 1961 (S-1643, 
87 th  Congress ) ,  a  b i l l  con ta in ing  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  wheat and 
f e e d  g r a i n  c o n t r o l  programs a s  w e l l  as p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  t r a d e ,  
a i d  t o  fa rmers  i n  housing,  e tc . - -a  m i x t u r e  of items bo th  
suppor ted  and opposed by farm i n t e r e s t s .  The percen tages  a r e  
p l o t t e d  in.  F igu re  4.2. The a g g r e g a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f i t s  t h e  
p r e d i c t i o n s  of t h e  i n t e r e s t  t heo ry  and ,  l i k e  t h a t  f o r  t h e  
l a b o r  b i l l ,  resembles  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  f u n c t i o n  from which it 
was deduced t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces s  was o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  good 
communication and v i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  consequences of  i n t e r e s t -  
r e l a t e d  d e c i s i o n s .  And, a g a i n ,  a  f l e x  p o i n t  appears  nea r  t h e  
c e n t e r  of t h e  range of farm c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  The same expecta-  
t i o n  ho lds ;  decomposing t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  should produce 
i n t e r n a l  r e p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  a g g r e g a t e  f u n c t i o n .  
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C o n t r o l l i n g  f o r  p a r t y  a f f i l i a t i o n . y i e l d s  t h e  two i n t e r n a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a l s o  p l o t t e d  i n .  F igure-  4 . 2 .  C lear ly - ,  t h e  expec- 
t a t i o n  i s  confirmed. I n  a d d i t i o n ; t h e  p l o t s  r e v e a l  ano the r  
tendency. .  A t .  low farm c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  g r e a t e r  v a r i -  
ance about  t h e  aggrega te - . t endency  t h a n  a t  h igh  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s .  
This  tendency f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  by p a r t y  t o  converge a s  a 
f u n c t i o n  of i n t e r e s t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,  r e l a t i v e  a t  l e a s t  t o  t h e  
l a b o r  v o t i n g  p a t t e r n ,  sugges t s  t h a t  a g r i c u l t u r e  i s  an  i s s u e -  
a r e a  p e r m i t t i n g  fewer e x t e r n a l  i n f l u e n c e s  t o  compound them- 
s e l v e s  w i t h  i t s e l f  a f t e r  it ach ieves  some deg ree  of p o l i t i c a l  
l e v e r a g e  w i t h i n  d i s t r i c t s .  A s  one might  e x p e c t  i n  most i s s u e  
a r e a s ,  low i n t e r e s t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  pe rmi t  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  
y i e l d  t o  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l l y  r e l e v a n t  i n f l u e n c e s ,  such a s  p a r t y  
a f f i l i a t i o n .  A t  h igh  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  t h e  e f f i c a c y  of t h e  
i n t e r e s t  i n t e n s i f i e s ,  and a s  e f f i c a c y  rises exogenous i n f l u -  
ences  on t h e  activities-)interest-apressure->decisions c h a i n  
a r e  muted. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper has cha l lenged  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  l i n k a g e s  
between congressmen and t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  a r e  t o  be  s een  
i n  t e r m s  of g e n e r a l  i s s u e  a r e a s .  A s  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  w e  have 
suggested t h a t  such l i n k a g e s  can be viewed e i t h e r  i n - t e r m s  of  
g e n e r a l  o r i e n t a t i o n s  toward government a c t i v i t y  t h a t  a r e  
i s s u e - f r e e ,  o r  i n  t e r m s  of i n f l u e n c e  p roces ses  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  
Secondly, we have argued that regardless of the level 
of attitude generality with which one is concerned, linkages 
between legislators and those they represent tend to complex 
phenomena, yielding non-linear relationships which are 
therefore not amenable to standard correlational procedures. 
Finally, we have provided a simple and operationally 
feasible formalization of representation, The theory is 
based on the proposition that representatives will act 
rationally so as to maximize their self interests, The 
electoral accountability of representatives equates their 
personal interests with the interests of their constituents. 
Bentley's theory of political processes may be used to inter- 
pret system-level consequences of this tendency. In Bentley's 
terms it may be assumed that the political system is operating 
to represent interests of constituents when the aggregate 
probability of decisions favoring given interests is an 
increasing, monotonic function of their magnitude (i.e., 
ability to alter election chances). The consequence is 
compatible with several differently interpretable political 
processes: consensus, compromise, and competing interests, 
etc. Variations from these patterns are also interpretable: 
disruptions in the political process, compounding of several 
effects. 
Several of these patterns have been illustrated with 
data from Congressional roll-call votes, under the hypothesis 
that the manner in which the political process functions is 
issue-specific. All roll-calls on civil rights legislation 
in the 87th and 88th Congress, for example,. were found to 
be decomposable into regional tendencies--consensus in the 
North, disruption,of representation in the South, On agri- 
cultura.1 and labor bills in the 87th Congress, on the other 
hand, the patterns suggested competing interests with good 
communication in the political system. Furthermore, in both 
these cases, the influence of party alignment was controlled 
and shown to be operative but also responsive-to interest 
pressure. On agricultural interests, moreover, the tendency 
was for partisan (exogenous) influences t,o decrease as a 
function of interest-concentration, 
In all circumstances, the theory. also permits certain 
deductions to be made from observed system tendencies to the 
tendencies of representatives or to the nature of certain in- 
fluence. processes. For example-, it may be hypothesized that 
flex points in agriculture or labor votes denote thresholds of 
agricultural or industrial organization within constituencies. 
Such thresholds may be meaningful as indicators of underlying 
patterns of social organization and of degrees of ramifica- 
tion of particular communities of interest. 
These considerations suggest the worth of further appli- 
cations. of the interest theory to the political process. 
The particular approach employed in this paper remains loose 
but suggestive. More sophisticated appli.cations of the same 
model are readily conceivable (e.g,, utilizing the joint 
distribution of several interest, combined in different ways, 
to make more accurate predictions). 
T a b l e  1. P e r c e n t a g e  D i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  S u p p o r t  f o r  HR-7371 
a n d  SJ -Res  29 S e p a r a t e l y  a n d  Combi.ned f r o m  A l l  
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  D i s t r i c t s ,  by P e r  C e n t  Non-Whi te ,  
8 7  t h  C o n g r e s s .  
- 7 4 ,  ( 8 1 )  
20 .0 -24 .9  
25 .0 -29 .9  
40 .0 -44 .9  
55 .0-59 .9-  0 .  ( 0 )  
60 .0 -64 .9  00 ( 0 )  0 ,  ( 0 )  
65 .0 -69 .9  
70 .0 -74 .9  
7 5 . 0 - 7 9 . 9  
80 .0 -84 .9  
85 .0 -89 .9  
90 .0 -94 .9  
9 5 . 0  or  m o r e  
5 0 ,  ( 2 )  
1 0 0 .  ( 1) 
00 ( 0 )  
0 .  ( 0 )  
1 0 0 .  ( 1) , 
1 0 0 .  ( 1) 
0 .  ( 0 )  
5 0 ,  ( 2 )  
1 0 0 ,  ( 1) 
0 .  0 )  
0 ,  ( 0 )  
1 0 0 .  ( 1) 
1 0 0 ,  ( 1) 
0 ,  ( 0 j  
5 0 ,  ( 4 )  
1 0 0 .  ( 2 )  
0 .  ( 0 )  
00 ( 0 )  
1 0 0 ,  ( 2 )  
1 0 0 ,  ( 2 )  
o o  ( 0 )  
Table 2. Percentage Distributions of Support for Civil Rights 
Legislation (HR-7371, SJ-Res 29), Holding Constant 
Northern-Southern.District Dichotomy,.- by.Per Cent Non- 




95.0 or more 
Table  3. Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n  of  Rol l -Cal l  Votes Favorab,le t o  Labor I n t e r e s t s  on 
HR-3935 ( F a i r  Labor Standards  Amendment of 1961, House of Represen ta t ives ,  
87 th  Congress ) ,  by D i s t r i c t  Concent ra t ion  of I n d u s t r i a l  Employees, and by 
P a r t y  A f f i l i a t i o n  o f .  Represen ta t ive .  
Table 4 .  Percen tage  D i s t r i b u t i o n  of  Ro l l  C a l l  Votes Favorable  t o  A g r i c u l t u r a l  
I n t e r e s t s  on S-1643 ( A g r i c u l t u r a l  Act of 1961, House- of Represen ta t ives ,  
87 th  Congress ) ,  by D i s t r i c t  Concent ra t ion  of Forms and by P a r t y  A f f i l i -  
a t i o n  of Represen ta t ives ,  
FOOTNOTES 
1. Guttman s u g g e s t s  10 i t e m s  a s  the.minimum t h a t  can  be  
used t o  d e f i n e  a  unidimensional  space ,  While w e  have 
never seen a  s c a l e  t h a t  meets t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ; w e  a r e  
uneasy about  u s ing  t h e  r h e t o r i c  of  scalogram a n a l y s i s  t o  
d e s c r i b e  2 o r  3 i t e m  sets, High c o e f f i c i e n t s  of  r ep ro -  
d u c i b i l i t y  can be ob ta ined  among sma l l  numbers of i n t e r -  
r e l a t e d  b u t  non-unidimensional a t t r i b u t e s ,  and i t . t h u s  
seems s a f e r  h e r e  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  techniques  of s c a l i n g  
t o  c o n s t r u c t  an  index t h a t  i s  n o t  assumed t o  be  un i -  
d imensional .  
W e  do n o t  mean t o  sugges t  t h a t  o u r  f a i l u r e  t o  r e p l i c a t e  
t h e  s c a l e s  u t i l i z e d  by Mi l l e r  and Stokes  i n d i c a t e s  a  
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  d a t a  on t h e i r  p a r t ,  Indeed,  
it is q u i t e  p robable  t h a t  t h e i r  s c a l e s  were c o n s t r u c t e d  
u t i l i z i n g  methods more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  than  t h o s e  developed 
by Guttman. See f o r  example Coombs 319651. We do t a k e  
i s s u e  w i t h  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e  c r i t e r i a  upon 
which t h e s e  s c a l e s  a r e . b a s e d .  S tokes  s t a t e s ,  i n  a  paper  
prepared f o r  t h e  1967 meet ings  of  t h e  American P o l i t i c a l  
Science Assoc i a t i on ,  t h a t  " t h e  c o n t e n t  of  t h e  a t t i t u d e  
items and t h e  methods by which they  have been used t o  
form t h e s e  t h r e e  a t t i t u d e  s c a l e s  o r  dimensions" a r e  
r e p o r t e d  i n  M i l l e r  and Stokes  (1966) .  Tha t  t hey  do  n o t  
appear  t h e r e  is  obvious ly  an o v e r s i g h t ,  b u t  w e  hope t h a t  
t h e s e  m a t e r i a l s  w i l l  be  made a v a i l a b i l e  i n  t h e i r  f o r t h -  
coming volume, Represen ta t ion  i n  t h e  American Congress. 
3 .  Percen tage  s c o r e s -  f o r  congressmen w e r e  t aken  from t h e  
Congress ional  Q u a r t e r l y  Almanac f o r  1958. 
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